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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEMPLEMIRE V. W&M WELDING: MISSOURI’S NEW STANDARD
FOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION RETALIATION CLAIMS
RETALIATES AGAINST STARE DECISIS
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of stare decisis is the general policy of all courts to adhere to
the ratio decidendi of prior cases decided by the highest court in a jurisdiction,
as long as the principle derived therefrom is one that is still constant with
reason.1 Stare decisis is also of crucial importance to American courts, as
Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor has stated that it promotes evenhandedness,
predictability, and consistency in the legal system that fosters reliance on
judicial decisions.2
For over thirty years, Missouri courts have honored the principle of stare
decisis in interpreting Missouri workers’ compensation laws.3 Since 1978,
Missouri courts have held that for a plaintiff to win a workers’ compensation
retaliation claim, the plaintiff had to show that the exercise of their rights was
the exclusive cause of their firing.4 Decades of employers and employees have
relied on the consistency of this standard. However, the exclusive causation
standard and stare decisis were randomly disregarded in early 2014, as
Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc. adopted the contributing standard for
workers’ compensation retaliation claims.5
To better understand the United States labor system, Part II of this
Casenote reviews the history of employment-at-will in the United States. Part
III discusses common law, federal, and Missouri state exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine, concluding with the workers’ compensation
retaliation law that will be the focus of the remainder of this Casenote. Part IV
reviews Missouri’s judicial and legislative history of the workers’
compensation retaliation laws and the dependence Missouri placed on the
exclusive causation standard. Part V briefly discusses developments outside of
workers’ compensation that the Templemire majority focused on in overturning
1. Frederick G. Kempin Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years 1800-1850, 3
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 28 (1959).
2. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2164 (2013).
3. See generally Mitchell v. United States, 575 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978), Davis v.
Richmond Special Rd. Dist., 649 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Hansome v. Northwestern
Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984), and Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. 1998).
4. See generally Mitchel, 575 S.W.2d 815.
5. Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 384 (Mo. 2014).
205
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precedent. Part VI focuses on the Templemire decision and Part VII analyzes
the decision and factors considered by both the majority and dissent of
Templemire.
This Casenote will discuss that factors such as judicial and legislative
developments outside of workers’ compensation law do not offer a compelling
reason to either uphold or repeal the exclusive causation standard in workers’
compensation laws. However, due to the fact that the Missouri General
Assembly did not offer an explicit causation standard within the statute, it was
the duty of Missouri courts to interpret the statute and then uphold that
decision in accordance with stare decisis. This Casenote will therefore
demonstrate Templemire’s disregard of over thirty years of precedent was
unfounded, impulsive, and hypocritical.
II. HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
In nearly every jurisdiction in the United States, under the employment-atwill doctrine, an employer can discharge an employee without notice or cause,
unless an employment contract specifies otherwise.6 However, employment-atwill was not always the governing doctrine. At English common law, where
the parties did not specify the duration of employer, the law presumed the
duration to last for one year.7 This presumption was based off the idea that
injustice would result if masters could have the benefit of servants’ labor
during planting and harvest seasons, but discharge them to avoid supporting
them during the unproductive winter.8 A similar injustice would follow if
servants who were supported during the hard season could leave their master
when labor was most needed.9 However, this one-year presumption could be
rebutted if facts, such as the customs of the industry or the length of pay
periods, showed the parties held a different intent.10
In the United States, English common law was largely followed, but the
presumption of annual hiring was not generally adopted.11 By 1870, courts
were confused, as some courts adopted the English presumption and others
disregarded it.12 Thus, in 1877, a treatise writer, Horace Wood, developed a
principle that would later be considered to be the source of the American
employment-at-will rule.13 Wood’s principle stated that general or indefinite
6. Jay M. Feinman, The Development of Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118, 118 (1976).
7. Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 J. BUS. L. 65, 66 (2013).
8. Feinman, supra note 6, at 120.
9. Feinman, supra note 6, at 120.
10. Summers, supra note 7, at 66.
11. Summers, supra note 7, at 66–67.
12. Summers, supra note 7, at 67.
13. Summers, supra note 7, at 67.
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hiring would be considered to be at-will, unless a party could establish proof
that stated otherwise.14 Thereby, Wood’s rule imposed a presumption that all
hirings were at-will, not for one year.15
Wood’s principle did not win immediate acceptance.16 However, in 1985,
New York adopted Wood’s principle in Martin v. New York Life Insurance
Co., by holding that an indefinite hiring was presumed to be a hiring at-will.17
The New York Court of Appeals gave credibility to Wood’s principle, and by
1930, it became embedded in American law.18
With employment-at-will, employees were able to resign from positions
they no longer cared to occupy and employers were permitted to discharge
employees at their whim.19 However, this equal footing between employers
and employees began to erode in the second half of the 20th century.20 Courts
and legislatures began to recognize that employers often have advantages when
negotiating with employees, and thus employees commonly feared being
unable to protect their livelihood from unjust termination.21
III. EXCEPTIONS TO EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
A.

Common Law Exceptions

In the 1970s, courts were skeptical about the divine right of employers to
fire employees at their will and began to limit the harshness of employment-atwill.22 Thus, the courts created the three major common law exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine: the public policy exception, the implied-contract
exception, and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception.23
The most widespread exception, the public policy exception, prevents
terminations for reasons that violate a state’s public policy.24 Although the

14. Summers, supra note 7, at 67; Feinman, supra note 6, at 126.
15. Summers, supra note 7, at 67.
16. Summers, supra note 7, at 67. For example, in the 1891 case Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 26
N.W. 143, 145 (N.Y. 1891), the New York Court of Appeals applied the pay period presumption,
stating: “In this country, at least, if a contract for hiring is at so much per month, it will readily be
presumed that the hiring was by the month, even if nothing was said about the term of service.”
However, this court would accept Wood’s principle four years later.
17. Feinman, supra note 6, at 128.
18. Summers, supra note 7, at 67–68.
19. Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, 124 U.S.
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 3 (2001).
20. Muhl, supra note 19, at 4.
21. Muhl, supra note 19, at 3–4.
22. Summers, supra note 7, at 70.
23. Muhl, supra note 19, at 4.
24. Muhl, supra note 19, at 4. Forty-three of the fifty states recognize the public policy
exception. Furthermore, the public policy exception is the only common law exception
recognized by Missouri.
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definition of public policy varies from state to state, most states narrowly limit
the definition to clear statements that can be found in the state’s constitution or
statutes.25 However, seventeen states, including Missouri, enable judges to
broadly define a state’s public policy, and are thus not confined by its
constitution and statutes.26 Examples of the public policy exception include
protection of employees who were discharged for serving on a jury, who
refused to join in employer’s illegal practices, or who reported violations to
public authorities.27
Some states recognize an exception to employment-at-will where an
implied contract is formed between an employer and employee even though no
formal, expressly written instrument regarding the relationship exists.28 A
common occurrence under this exception occurs when courts find that the
contents of an employee handbook, such as statements that employees will be
terminated only for “just cause,” create implied contracts.29
The final judicial exception, the exception for a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, is only recognized by eleven states.30 By far the broadest of the
common law exceptions, this exception reads a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing into every employment relationship.31 Therefore, employers in those
states are held to a “just cause” standard and all terminations made in bad faith
are prohibited.32
B.

Federal Exceptions33

Statutory exceptions to employment-at-will are also commonplace.34 The
1960s was an era that introduced major federal legislative protections for
employees, starting with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.35 Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which is applicable to employers with fifteen or more

25. Muhl, supra note 19, at 7.
26. Muhl, supra note 19, at 7.
27. Summer, supra note 7, at 70–71.
28. Muhl, supra note 19, at 7. Thirty-eight of the fifty states recognize an exception where
an implied contract exists. Missouri is in the minority of states that does not recognize this
exception.
29. Muhl, supra note 19, at 7–8.
30. Muhl, supra note 19, at 10.
31. Muhl, supra note 19, at 10.
32. Muhl, supra note 19, at 10.
33. This Section seeks to outline major pieces of legislation that create exceptions to
employment-at-will. This should not be interpreted as an exclusive list, but rather as one that
highlights major legislation relevant to this Casenote.
34. Summers, supra note 7, at 77.
35. Muhl, supra note 19, at 3.
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employees, protects employees against discrimination on the basis of race,
color, national origin, sex, and religion.36
In 1967, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which
applies to employers with twenty or more employees, was enacted to protect
individuals forty years or older from employment discrimination based on
age.37 The ADEA also mandates that it is unlawful to retaliate against an
individual for opposing practices that discriminate based on age, filing a
discrimination charge, or in any way participating in an investigation or
proceeding under ADEA.38
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) prohibits
employers with fifteen or more employees from discriminating against
qualified individuals with disabilities.39 According to the ADA, an individual
with a disability is a person who has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such
impairment, or is regarded as having such impairment.40 Employers that
qualify under that act are required to make a reasonable accommodation to the
employee if it would not impose undue hardship on their business.41
In 1993, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) became applicable to
private-section employers with fifty or more employees in twenty or more
workweeks and all public agencies.42 The FMLA provides eligible employees
up to twelve weeks unpaid leave for any twelve month period for reasons
including the birth and care of a newborn child, caring for a spouse, child, or
parent with a serious health condition, and taking medical leave when the
employee faces a serious health condition.43
Therefore, major federal exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine
include prohibiting firing employees on the basis of race, color, national origin,

36. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT., available at
http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/federalresources/federalstatutesregulationsandguidanc/pages/ti
tleviiofthecivilrightsactof1964.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
37. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT.,
available at http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/federalresources/federalstatutesregulationsandguid
anc/pages/agediscriminationinemploymentactof1967.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
38. Id.
39. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT.,
available at http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/federalresources/federalstatutesregulationsandguid
anc/pages/americanswithdisabilitiesactof1990%28ada%29.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
40. Id.
41. Id. Undue hardship is defined as an action that requires significant difficult or expense
when considering the employer’s size, financial resources, and nature of operation.
42. Family and Medical Leave Act, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT., available at
http://www.shrm.org/templatestools/samples/policies/pages/fmlaleave%28withservicemember
leaveexpansion%29.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
43. Id.
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sex, religion, age (if over forty years old), disabilities that do not cause undo
hardship, and certain eligible leaves of absence under the FMLA.
C. Missouri Exceptions44
The Missouri legislature codified the federal legislation of Title VII,
ADEA, and ADA, with minor changes, in the Missouri Human Rights Act
(HMRA).45 The HMRA prohibits employment discrimination based on an
individual’s race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, disability that
does not cause employers undue hardship, or age (if between forty and sixtynine years old).46 The Missouri HMRA is applicable to any employer with six
or more employees.47 Therefore, like in the federal statutes, Missouri
recognizes exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine when employees are
fired based on discrimination classified in any of the above-listed categories.
Missouri also recognizes an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
by prohibiting employers from terminating employees for filing a workers’
compensation claim.48 In Missouri, employers with five or more employees
must carry insurance to pay for medical treatment and lost time benefits for
those who are injured in the course of their employment.49 Section 287.780 of
the Missouri Revised Statutes forbids employers from discharging or in any
way discriminating against employees who exercise their rights to recover for
their work injury or illness.50 Therefore, retaliation for workers’ compensation
is a Missouri recognized exception to employment-at-will.
Although the principle that employers may not retaliate against employees
for exercising their rights under workers’ compensation laws seems
straightforward, it has recently brought forward tremendous debate as the
Missouri Supreme Court has struggled to maintain a standard by which an
employee can win a claim against their employer for wrongful termination.

44. Again, this Casenote is focused on major Missouri statutory exceptions to employmentat-will and the legislation discussed is in no way an exclusive list of protections provided to
Missouri employees.
45. Discrimination in Employment, MO. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
available at http://labor.mo.gov/mohumanrights/Discrimination/employment (last visited Jan. 19,
2015).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. MO. REV. STAT. §287.780 (2014).
49. Facts for Injured Workers: Information about Workers’ Compensation in Missouri,
DIVISION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, available at https://labor.mo.gov/sites/default/files/
pubs_forms/WC-101-AI.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
50. MO. REV. STAT. §287.780 (2014).
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IV. MISSOURI’S HISTORY OF RETALIATION FOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
A.

Missouri Courts

In 1978, the Missouri Court of Appeals heard Mitchell v. St. Louis County,
in which Mitchell alleged that she was discharged based upon her filing of a
Chapter 287 workers’ compensation claim.51 Alternatively, St. Louis County
cited excessive absenteeism as the reason for Mitchell’s discharge.52 For the
six months preceding her discharge, Mitchell was absent seventy-six and a half
hours of work, sixty-eight of which were attributed to her workers’
compensation injury.53 Mitchell conceded that she had also missed work for
reasons unrelated to her injury, including missed bus connections, chills, sore
throat, tooth extraction, bad weather, oversleeping, personal business, and
gynecologist appointments.54
The court interpreted Missouri Revised Statutes Section 287.780 to say
that a cause of action for retaliation for workers’ compensation lies only if an
employee is discharged discriminatorily by reason of exercising his or her
rights under the workers’ compensation law.55 The court reasoned that there is
nothing within the workers’ compensation law indicating that an employee
who has been injured and has returned to work may be absent repeatedly
without penalty.56 Thus, the Missouri court established an exclusive causation
test to determine whether an employee was terminated in retaliation for
exercising her or her rights under workers’ compensation laws.
In 1983, the Missouri Court of Appeals declined an invitation to overturn
the standard articulated in Mitchell.57 In Davis v. Richmond Special Rd. Dist.,
Davis was injured and attempted to return to work after receiving medical
treatment.58 At a regular meeting, the Commissioners voted to terminate Davis,
and therefore Davis filed a lawsuit against the defendant for retaliation.59 Davis
urged the court to overturn Mitchell, and instead find that a claim under
Section 287.780 is provable by inference premised by the fact that an
employee was terminated after perusing their rights under workers’
compensation laws.60
However, the court upheld Mitchell, concluding that under Section
287.780, there must be a causal relationship between an employee exercising
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Mitchell v. St. Louis County, 575 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 814–815.
Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d at 815.
Id.
Davis v. Richmond Special Rd. Dist., 649 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
Id. at 252–53.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 254.
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her or her workers’ compensation rights and the employee’s discharge arising
precisely from the employee’s exercise of those rights.61 The court declined to
adopt a rule where a plaintiff would be relieved of the burden of showing that
his or her discharge was the direct result of discrimination.62 Davis was unable
to prove that his discharge was the result of his exercising his workers’
compensation rights. He could only show he was injured and was later
discharged.63
In 1984, the Supreme Court of Missouri adopted the tests articulated in
Mitchell and Davis in Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co.64 Hansome
was injured in August 1977, received workers’ compensation, and then
received a discharge letter in October 1977.65 A manager at Northwestern
Cooperage told Hansome: “You got hurt on the job; you drew your Workers’
Compensation. . .and I feel I just can’t use any longer.”66 The Missouri
Supreme Court adopted the standard articulated in Mitchell and Davis, and
articulated a test that a plaintiff must be an employee of defendant before the
injury, have exercised a right granted by Chapter 287, be discharged by their
employer, and that there exist an exclusive causal relationship between
plaintiff’s actions and defendant’s actions.67 Therefore, the Missouri Supreme
Court upheld the trial court’s verdict for Hansome, holding that he was able to
prove his burden under the exclusive causation standard.68
Over a decade after Hansome, the Missouri Supreme Court again upheld
the exclusive causation standard in Crabtree v. Bugby.69 Crabtree was injured
at her job at Silver Maple Farms, received workers’ compensation, and
returned to work eight months later.70 During Crabtree’s absence, Silver Maple
Farms hired a new supervisor, who did not get along with Crabtree.71 Within
an eight-day period, Crabtree received four disciplinary reports from her
supervisor.72 Shortly thereafter, Crabtree was terminated and claimed that her
termination was in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim.73
61. Davis, 649 S.W.2d at 255.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 256.
64. Hansome, 679 S.W.2d at 275 (Mo. 1984).
65. Id. at 274.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 275.
68. Id. at 276. The Hansome case, besides being the first case in which the Missouri
Supreme Court adopted the exclusive causation test, is also a case that illustrates that the
exclusive causation test, though difficult, is attainable for employees. Hansome presented
sufficient evidence of retaliation and was therefore successful in winning his case.
69. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 71 (Mo. 1998).
70. Id. at 69.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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The Missouri Supreme Court yet again upheld the exclusive causation
standard.74 The court stressed that they should not lightly disturb their own
precedent, stating that a possible disagreement by the current court with the
statutory analysis of a predecessor court was not a satisfactory basis for
violating the doctrine of stare decisis.75 The court firmly stated that if there
was an injustice, it would be for them to abandon the requirement that the
discharge be exclusively caused by the exercise of rights pursuant to the
workers’ compensation law.76
The court also noted their concern of the adoption of a less stringent law,
stating that under a lesser standard, an employee who admittedly was fired for
tardiness, absenteeism, or incompetence at work would still be able to maintain
a cause of action for discharge if the worker could persuade the fact-finder that
one of the factors in their discharge was the exercise of rights under workers’
compensation laws.77 The court held that the purpose of the workers’
compensation law was to compensate workers for job-related injuries, not to
insure job security, and concluded that the exclusive causation standard best
served that purpose.78
Therefore, the history of the court is clear. Beginning in Mitchell in 1978,
and consistently through Crabtree in 1998, Missouri courts have upheld the
exclusive causation standard.79 The court in Crabtree strongly emphasized the
problems of a lower standard, namely that employees who are tardy, absent, or
incompetent would still have a cause of action if they also had a filed workers’
compensation claim.80 Furthermore, the Crabtree decision clarified that the
principle of stare decisis required the court to consistently apply the exclusive
causation standard.81

74. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72.
75. Id. at 71–72.
76. Id. at 72.
77. Id. It should be noted that the concerns of the court here are very justified. The
circumstances they are describing is the case that occurred in Mitchell v. St. Louis County, 575
S.W.2d 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). There, Mitchell claimed workers’ compensation retaliation
after she missed work for reasons unrelated to her injury, including missed bus connections,
chills, sore throat, tooth extraction, bad weather, oversleeping, personal business, and
gynecologist appointments.
78. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72.
79. Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d at 815; Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72.
80. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72.
81. Id. at 71–72.
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Missouri Legislature

In 2005, the Missouri legislature enacted a comprehensive reform of
Chapter 287.82 There were numerous revisions and additions to Chapter 287.83
One amendment required work to be a prevailing factor rather than a
substantial factor in causing the injury, meaning that employees had a higher
burden of proving there was no other non-employment contributing factors to
their injury.84 Another amendment required that the accidents be identifiable
by time and place of occurrence, meaning that injuries caused by repetitive
actions or motions overtime would be excluded from workers’ compensation.85
However, in the numerous amendments that the 2005 Missouri legislature
passed, the General Assembly did not discuss or in any way change the longstanding test of exclusive causation for retaliation cases.86
V. DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
Two cases arose in 2007 and 2010, which although seemingly unrelated to
workers’ compensation and lawsuits for retaliation for workers’ compensation,
would come to have a large impact on workers’ compensation lawsuits.
First, in 2007, the Missouri Supreme Court heard Daugherty v. City of Md.
Heights. In Daugherty, a fifty-nine-year-old police captain was terminated, and
had evidence that the city administrator was attempting to terminate employees
over the age of fifty-five because their salaries were costly to the city.87
Daugherty brought suit under the MHRA, which is an exception to
employment-at-will doctrine, as it prohibits termination under many
categories, including age if between the years of forty and sixty-nine.88
The Missouri Supreme Court noted that nothing in the statutory language
of the MHRA required a plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a substantial
or determining factor in an employment decision.89 Therefore, the court
interpreted the language of the MHRA to require a contributing factor
standard, meaning that plaintiffs only had to show that consideration of age (or
82. Patrick J. Platter, History, Administration, and Jurisdiction, in WORKERS’
COMPENSATION LAW (4th ed. 2013), available at http://www.mobarcle.org/bookstore/chapters/
wc.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
83. See generally BRIAN STOKES, Selected Issues in Workers’ Compensation Law: 2005
Changes in the Law, THE STOKES LAW OFFICE, available at http://brianstokeslaw.com/index.
php/refernce-information/211-2005-changes-to-worker-compensation-law (last visited Jan. 19,
2015).
84. N. Drew Kemp, Note, Exclusively Confusing: Who Has Jurisdiction to Determine
Jurisdiction Under the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law?, 78 MO L. REV. 897, 904 (2013).
85. Kemp, supra.
86. Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 389–90 (Mo. 2014).
87. Daugherty v. City of Md. Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 816–17 (Mo. 2007).
88. Id. at 816; Discrimination in Employment, supra note 45.
89. Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 819.
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other protected characteristics) contributed to their unfair treatment.90 The
court did not in any way discuss workers’ compensation within the Daugherty
opinion.
Second, in 2010, the Missouri Supreme Court heard Fleshner v. Pepose
Vision Inst., which discussed the public policy exception to employment-atwill.91 Fleshner received a telephone call from the United States Department of
Labor, who was investigating Pepose Vision to determine whether or not they
failed to pay employees for overtime.92 Fleshner complied with the investigator
and was terminated after reporting the call to her supervisor.93 As Fleshner was
the first time in which Missouri recognized the public policy exception to
employment-at-will, the Missouri Supreme Court had to decide whether the
casual standard for public policy exceptions should be the exclusive causation
standard that was articulated in retaliation for workers’ compensation cases.94
The court decided to reject the exclusive causation standard for cases of
public policy and instead adopted a contributing factor standard, similar to the
Daugherty standard.95 The Missouri Supreme Court clarified that although
exclusive causation was not the proper standard for wrongful discharge on
public policy exceptions to employment-at-will, it was the appropriate standard
for cases asserting retaliation from workers’ compensation.96 Therefore, while
adopting a different standard for public-policy exceptions, in 2010, the
Missouri Supreme Court upheld the long-existing exclusive causation standard
for workers’ compensation retaliation cases.97

90. Id. In fact, the Daugherty decision upholds stare decisis, as it cites many cases in its
reasoning for explicitly adopting contributing factor. In Midstate Oil Co. Inc. v. Mo. Comm’n on
Human Rights, the court looked to whether a defendant’s conduct was “motivated” by an
invidious purpose. Midstate Oil Co. Inc. v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d 842, 845
(Mo. 2004). In McBryde v. Ritenour Sch. Dist., the court stated that given the similarity between
the definition of “motivating” and “contributing,” they were not persuaded that motivating factor
is a higher threshold than contributing factor, and held that under the MHRA plaintiffs only
needed to demonstrate that discrimination was a contributing factor in the employment decision.
McBryde v. Ritenour Sch. Dist., 207 S.W.3d 162, 170 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)
91. Muhl, supra note 19 at 4; Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., 304 S.W.3d 81, 91 (Mo.
2010).
92. Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 86.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 92.
95. Id. at 93–94.
96. Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 93.
97. Id.
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VI. TEMPLEMIRE CHANGES EVERYTHING
A.

Majority

In 2014, Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc. uprooted nearly thirty-five
years of precedent when the Missouri Supreme Court suddenly decided to
change the causal standard for workers’ compensation cases. In January 2006,
Templemire was injured when a large metal beam fell from a forklift and
crushed his foot.98 He was cleared to return to work about a month later on
light duty and W&M Welding accommodated Templemire by creating light
duty assignments for him.99 In November 2006, on the day in question, the
defendant received a request to have a railing washed and picked up.100
There are two different narratives of what occurred next. According to
W&M Welding, Templemire was directed to wash the railing immediately, but
two hours later the railing was still unwashed and Templemire was taking a
break.101 W&M Welding claimed that Templemire stated that he was taking a
break for his foot and if the owner did not like it, he could take it up with
Templemire’s physician.102 Templemire was then fired for insubordination.103
However, Templemire stated that he was told the railing would not be
ready until later in the afternoon.104 Templemire claimed that as he went
towards the wash bay to wash the railing, he stopped to rest his infected foot
and was then confronted by the owner of W&M Welding.105 Templemire
asserted that he tried to explain the events, but was discharged immediately.106
In his lawsuit, Templemire, like many previous plaintiffs, petitioned the
court to change the causation standard for workers’ compensation retaliation
cases to contributing factor instead of exclusive causation.107 The court
discussed the previous history of retaliation for workers’ compensation. They
noted Mitchell, where the Missouri Court of Appeals stated that a cause of
action existed only if an employee was discharged by reason of exercising his
or her rights under the workers’ compensation laws.108 The court also
discussed the opinion in Davis, which stated that an employee’s discharge by
his employer must arise precisely from the employee’s exercise of his or her

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc. 433 S.W.3d 371, 373 (Mo. 2014).
Id. at 373–74.
Id. at 374.
Id.
Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 374–75.
Id. at 375.
Id. at 374.
Id.
Id.
Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 376.
Id. at 377 (citing Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d at 815).
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rights, and therefore employees must prove a causal relationship between their
discharge and the exercise of his or her rights.109
The court also recognized the test that it made years prior in Hansome, that
the plaintiff must have had status as employee before the injury, have exercised
his or her rights granted under Chapter 287, be discharged by their employer,
and that an exclusive causal connection must exist between plaintiff’s actions
and defendant’s actions.110 Furthermore, the court noted its decision in
Crabtree, which stated that exclusive causation should remain the standard
because the court should not lightly disturb its own precedent and mere
disagreement by the current court would not be a satisfactory basis for
violating stare decisis.111
However, the Missouri Supreme Court then stated that their recent decision
in Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst. questioned Hansome and its progeny.112 The
court held that after thirty-five years of precedent, they would disregard the
exclusive causation standard and would adopt the contributing factor standard
for workers’ compensation retaliation cases.113
The majority looked to the language of Missouri Revised Statutes Section
287.780, which states: “No employer or agent shall discharge or in any way
discriminate against any employee for exercising any of his or her rights under
this chapter.”114 The court stated that because the language uses the phrase “in
any way” the legislature clearly intended the application of a contributing
factor standard and this standard better fulfilled the purpose of the statute.115
The court did not find it persuasive that in 2005 the Missouri General
Assembly failed to articulate a new standard for workers’ compensation
retaliation cases.116 They classified the 2005 reform as inaction, which could
not be interpreted to be approval of the court’s reading of a statute.117
Regarding to the doctrine of stare decisis, the court noted that although the
doctrine promotes security in the law, adherence to precedent is not
absolute.118 The court stated that where it appears that an opinion is clearly
erroneous and manifestly wrong, the rule of stare decisis is never applied to

109. Id. (citing Davis, 649 S.W.2d at 255).
110. Id. at 377–378 (citing Hansome, 679 S.W.2d at 275).
111. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 378 (citing Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 71–72).
112. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 378.
113. Id. at 384.
114. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (2014).
115. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384.
116. Id. at 380.
117. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 380, (citing Med. Shoppe Int’l Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 156
S.W.3d 333, 334, 335 (Mo. 2005)).
118. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379 (citing Independence-Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Independence
Sch. Dist. 223 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Mo. 2007); Med. Shoppe, 156 S.W.3d at 334–35).
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prevent the repudiation of such a decision.119 Then, without much discussion,
the court held that its own rulings in Hansome and Crabtree were clearly
erroneous and thus stare decisis would not be applicable to workers’
compensation retaliation cases.120
B.

Dissent

The dissent in Templemire criticized many aspects of the majority’s
decision. First, the dissent objected to the majority’s application of Fleshner.121
The majority held that the decision in Fleshner supports abandoning the
exclusive cause standard established in Hansome and Crabtree.122 However, in
examining the Fleshner opinion, the dissent noted that Fleshner rules on the
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, not to workers’
compensation retaliation claims.123 The dissent emphasized that the holdings in
Hansome and Crabtree were not based on judicially created common law
doctrine, as was Fleshner’s interpretations on public policy.124 Rather,
Hansome and Crabtree were interpretations of a Missouri statute on which the
General Assembly is presumed to rely and to which the court should give the
greatest deference to stare decisis.125
Next, the dissent stated that there was a strong argument of legislative
reliance on Hansome and Crabtree.126 In 2005, the General Assembly
overhauled the workers’ compensation laws, and the dissent argued that the
legislature took affirmative steps to retain the exclusive causation standard for
workers’ compensation retaliation claims.127 While the General Assembly
expressly abrogated prior cases of the Missouri Supreme Court by name and
citation, they did not in any way mention the decisions in Hansome and
Crabtree.128 Unlike the majority, the dissent believed the amendments were
significantly more than legislative inaction.129 The dissent reasoned that the
119. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379 (citing Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc. 365 S.W.2d
539, 546 (Mo. 1963)).
120. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 380. In a footnote, the court indulges in a slippery-slope line
of reasoning that strict adherence to stare decisis would result in a society that separated
schoolchildren on the “separate but equal” doctrine that prohibited interracial marriage and that
forbade women from serving on juries; Id. at 380 n.90. Indeed, these evils needed to be corrected,
but the court fails to articulate a principled framework for determining when stare decisis should
be abandoned.
121. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389.
122. Id. at 378, 389.
123. Id. at 389.
124. Id.
125. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 390.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 390.
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legislature’s decision not to repeal the exclusive causation standard was the
General Assembly’s affirmative support of the exclusive causation standard.130
Finally and most importantly, the dissent strongly stressed the importance
of stare decisis, stating: “What makes this country’s legal system the envy of
the modern democratic world, and what sets it apart from most others, is the
reliability of the outcome of cases based on the doctrine of stare decisis.”131
The dissent noted the decision in Crabtree, which stressed that the court should
not lightly disturb its own precedent due to mere disagreement by the current
court with the analysis of a predecessor court.132 The dissent stated that, in the
sixteen years since Crabtree, nothing has changed within the court other than
its membership.133 The dissent stressed that the doctrine of stare decisis has
little practical or intellectual value if all it takes to change the law was the
passage of time and court membership.134
Therefore, due to the distinction between workers’ compensation
retaliation cases and public policy exception cases, the legislature’s decision
not to abrogate the exclusive causation standard for workers’ compensation
retaliation cases, and the doctrine of stare decisis, the dissent wholeheartedly
rebuked the majority’s divergence from the exclusive causation standard.
VII. ANALYSIS
A.

The Effect of Fleshner on Templemire

In Templemire, the court disagreed on the effect that Fleshner should have
upon workers’ compensation retaliation cases. The majority stated that
workers’ compensation retaliation case law remained unquestioned until the
decision reached in Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Institute.135 The court held that
there can be no tolerance for employment discrimination in the workplace, be
it based upon protected classes such as gender, race, or age [Daugherty], or an
employee blowing the whistle on an employer’s illegal practices in violation of
public policy [Fleshner], or for exercising workers’ compensation rights.136
However, the dissent disagreed completely with the majority’s analysis.137
The dissent noted a key distinction between public policy claims and workers’
compensation retaliation cases, namely that public policy termination claims
arise under the common law of torts.138 The dissent stated that the holdings in
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id. at 386.
Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 386 (citing Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 71).
Id. at 386–87.
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 384.
Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389.
Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389 (citing Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 93).
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Hansome and Crabtree were not based on judicially created common law
doctrine, nor were they interpretations of an infrequently amended state
constitution, but rather were interpretations of a Missouri statute, on which the
General assembly is presumed to rely.”139
As the dissent noted, a distinction between Fleshner and the workers’
compensation retaliation case history is that Fleshner discussed public policy,
a common law principle, while workers’ compensation is a statutory
provision.140 However, it is worth noting that the contributory factor standard
used in public policy exceptions, as articulated in Fleshner, is also used for the
statutory provision of the MHRA in Daugherty.141 As both the MHRA and
workers’ compensation retaliation laws are statutory, the question arises as to
whether both should follow the same standard. The answer clearly must be no,
as it would be ridiculous to argue that all statutes must uphold the same
causation standard. Rather, in their analysis, the court in Fleshner and the
dissent in Templemire simply noted that Fleshner’s articulation of a
contributing factor standard for public policy decisions in no way requires the
court to do the same for statutory workers’ compensation laws.142
Therefore, what effect Fleshner should have on workers’ compensation
retaliation cases is easily debatable. The text of Fleshner appears to affirm the
decisions in Hansome and Crabtree, as it states: “There is a key distinction
between workers’ compensation retaliation cases and public-policy exception
cases. While prior cases indicate that ‘exclusive causation’ is the appropriate
standard for retaliation, [it] is not the proper standard for wrongful discharge
based on the public-policy exception.”143
However, it is possible that the Fleshner decision may have questioned the
application of the exclusive causation standard for workers’ compensation
retaliation cases. The majority noted that after Fleshner, it seemed nonsensical
that the exercise of workers’ compensation rights not be afforded the same
level of protection as the activities protected by the MHRA and public policy
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.144 This principle is reflected in
the majority’s statement that discrimination cannot be tolerated for
discrimination based upon protected classes, an employee blowing the whistle
on an employer’s illegal practices, or for exercising workers’ compensation

139. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389.
140. Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 93. The Fleshner Court stated that “[t]here is a key distinction
between workers’ compensation retaliation cases and public-policy exception cases. Workers’
compensation cases arise under statute, while public policy exception cases arise under the
common law of torts.”
141. Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 820; Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 94–95.
142. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389 (citing Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 93).
143. Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 93.
144. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384.
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rights.145 Therefore, although the words of Fleshner could be interpreted to
affirm the exclusive causation standard for workers’ compensation, it could
also be interpreted that the deeper meaning of Fleshner in fact does the
opposite.146
The impact of Fleshner on the workers’ compensation retaliation cases is
argued well by both the majority and the dissent of Templemire. It is difficult
to critique the majority for reading Fleshner in terms of its practical
application, rather than the text used. However, the same cannot be said for the
interpretation of the language of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 287.780 as
well as the majority’s disregard of stare decisis.
B.

The Missouri Legislature

The language of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 287.780 as well as the
General Assembly’s intentions during the 2005 are both highly contested in the
Templemire decision. Although it can be said that the majority and dissent are
justified in their interpretations of the 2005 amendments of the Missouri
legislature, the Templemire majority is cleared flawed in their interpretation of
Section 287.780.
The intent of the Missouri General Assembly during the 2005 overhaul of
workers’ compensation law is easily debatable.147 The majority stressed the
fallacy in relying upon legislative inaction, holding that inaction could be
interpreted to be approval of a court’s reading of a statute, but could just as
well mean that the forces in favor of changing the law are matched by the
forces against changing it.148 Therefore, the majority concluded it would be
merely speculative to infer the Missouri General Assembly’s approval of the
exclusive causation standard through their decision not to revise Section
287.780.149
The majority has support in former Missouri Supreme Court case law,
namely in Med. Shoppe Int’l Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue. Here, as the majority
stated, the court held that legislative inaction could simply mean that the forces
arrayed in favor of changing the law were matched by the forces against
changing it.150 The court stressed that an incorrect judicial interpretation of a
statute could stand simply because the legislature paid no attention to it.151
Although it seems unlikely that the legislature did not pay attention to Section
287.780 during their expansive overhaul of workers’ compensation laws, the

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 93; Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384.
Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 380.
Id. (citing Med. Shoppe, 156 S.W.3d at 334).
Id.
Med. Shoppe, 156 S.W.3d at 334.
Id.
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precedent of Med. Shoppe makes it clear that the General Assembly’s inaction
cannot be interpreted to be approval of the court’s reading of a statute.152
The dissent, unlike the majority, found great significance in the actions of
the 2005 General Assembly.153 What the majority classified as legislative
inaction, the dissent interpreted as affirmative steps that demonstrated the
legislature’s intent to retain the exclusive causation standard.154 The dissent
found it significant that the legislature performed an extreme overhaul on the
workers’ compensation laws, that repealed different causation standards and
cases of Missouri courts by name and citation, but did not repeal the exclusive
causation standard articled in Hansome and Crabtree.155 The legislature could
have easily enacted a new causation standard for workers’ compensation
retaliation cases by mention of Hansome and Crabtree, but did not.156
Therefore, due to the extreme nature of the General Assembly’s overhaul, the
dissent viewed the 2005 amendments as a powerful statement, rather than
inaction.157
The dissent’s argument is also supported by Missouri case law. In 1976,
the Missouri Supreme Court held: “In construing statutes to ascertain
legislative intent, it is presumed the legislature is aware of the interpretation of
existing statutes. . .”158 Therefore, re-enactment of a statute after judicial
construction is equivalent to legislative adoption of such construction.159 Under
this interpretation, the 2005 amendments are the legislature’s adoption of the
exclusive causation standard for workers’ compensation retaliation cases, not
what the majority classifies as legislative inaction.
In viewing the arguments to the 2005 amendments, both the majority and
dissent have arguments rooted in Missouri Supreme Court precedent.160 It is
difficult to say which precedent is better and therefore both have valid
arguments to the interpretation of the 2005 amendments of the Missouri
General Assembly. However, the majority does not have a similarly valid
argument in discussing their interpretation of the language of Section 287.780.
152. Id.
153. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389.
154. Id. at 390.
155. Id. at 389–90.
156. Id. at 390.
157. Id.
158. Kilbane v. Dir. of the Dep’t of Revenue, 544 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Mo. 1976) (affirming the
rule stated in Gross v. Merchants-Produce Bank, 390 S.W.2d 591, 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)).
159. Dow Chemical Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, State of Mo., 834 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Mo. 1992).
In Dow, the court explains it is not just the text of a statute that indicates legislative intent;
judicial decisions also give effect to the statute. The judicial construction of a statute by a court of
last resort becomes a part of the statute as if it had been so amended by the legislature.
160. The majority’s precedent is found in Med. Shoppe Int’l Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 156
S.W.3d 333, 334 (Mo. 2005). The dissent has precedent rooted in Kilbane, 544 S.W.2d at 11
(Mo. 1976) and Dow Chemical Co., 834 S.W.2d at 745 (Mo. 1992).
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Regarding to the language of Section 287.780, the majority stated that a
contributory factor standard fulfills the purpose of the statute, which is to
prohibit employers from discharging or in any way discriminating against an
employee for exercising his or her rights under Chapter 287.161 The majority
held that the use of the phrase, “in any way,” is more consistent with a
contributory factor standard than an exclusive causation standard.162 However,
the majority does not in any way support this assertion; they simply stated that
a contributing factor standard better fulfills the “in any way” language of the
statute and criticized the Hansome court for plucking the exclusive causation
language “out of thin air.”163
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s opinion that the court in
Hansome did not interpret the wording of Missouri Revised Statutes Section
287.780.164 The dissent made the obvious conclusion that the text of Section
287.780 did not provide any specific causation standard, and thus the court had
to analyze how to enact Section 287.780.165 Indeed, Hansome quoted Section
287.780 and interpreted the four elements necessary to make a claim under the
statute.166 The dissent stated that there can be no doubt that, in Hansome, the
court was required to and did in fact construe Section 287.780.167
Furthermore, Hansome cited Davis and Mitchell as precedent that aided in
the interpretation of Section 287.780. Specifically, the Davis court concluded
that Missouri Revised Statutes Section 287.780 showed legislative intent that
an employee must prove that they were discriminated against or discharged
precisely due to the exercise of his or her workers’ compensation rights.168 The
court reasoned that the wording of Section 287.780, which states that
employers shall not discharge or discriminate for exercising their rights under
Chapter 287, does not reflect that a cause of action exists due to the mere fact
that an employee was discharged after they exercised their workers’
compensation rights.169
In interpreting the text of Section 287.780, the dissent’s argument clearly
outweighs the majority’s opinion. The majority stated that a contributory factor
standard better fulfills the purpose of the statute due to the language of “in any
way” located in Section 287.780.170 However, the words “contributing factor”

161. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 379, 384.
164. Id. at 389.
165. Id. The dissent indicates that the use of the language “in any way” is not indicative of
any standard, but is simply part of the language used to prohibit workplace discrimination.
166. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389.
167. Id.
168. Davis v. Richmond Special Rd. Dist., 649 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
169. Id.
170. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384.
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much like the words “exclusive causation” do not appear anywhere in Section
287.780.171 Therefore, the majority’s reading of Section 287.780 is their
interpretation, much like exclusive causation standard, was the interpretation of
the previous Missouri Supreme Court Justices. The majority’s interpretation
cannot be said to be any better or worse than the decision of previous Missouri
courts and thus cannot possibly justify overruling over three decades of
precedent.172
C. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis
Arguably, what should determine the outcome of Templemire is whether
stare decisis should stand and preserve the exclusive causation standard. The
Templemire majority noted that the doctrine of stare decisis promotes security
in the law by encouraging adherence to previously decided cases, but also
stated that adherence to precedent is not absolute.173 Indeed, the Missouri
Supreme Court had stated previously in Med. Shoppe Int’l Inc. that the
adherence to precedent is not absolute, that the passage of time and the
expertise of enforcing a purportedly incorrect precedent may demonstrate a
compelling case for changing course.174
The Med Shoppe court noted that the changing needs of society could
trump adherence to precedent and demonstrate the fallacy of an earlier
interpretation.175 However, the failure of the Templemire majority is that they
in no way discussed how needs of society have changed between the decisions
in Crabtree and Templemire that would require such disregard to stare
decisis.176 Instead, they bluntly stated that Hansome’s decision was unfounded
and end the discussion on stare decisis.177
Although not discussed by the Templemire majority, the Fleshner court
possibly discussed a need of society that could justify the overturning of the
doctrine of stare decisis.178 There, the court stated that the exclusive causation
standard was difficult on employees because the employer could assert that the
employee was also fired for another reason.179 Although this is a valid concern,

171. MO. REV. STAT. §287.780 (2014).
172. See discussion infra Section VII-C.
173. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379.
174. Med. Shoppe, 156, S.W.3d at 335.
175. Id.
176. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379–80.
177. Id. at 379. As discussed infra Section VII-B, Hansome’s decision cannot be said to be
unfounded, but rather is a valid interpretation of Section 287.780 that relies on previous case law
to support its decision.
178. Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 93.
179. Id. Here, the Fleshner court was discussing why “exclusive causation” was not
appropriate for public policy exceptions to employment-at-will and was not discussing workers’
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it cannot be said to be a new concern faced by the court, but instead is one that
the courts in Mitchell, Davis, Hansome, and Crabtree had to consider years
ago in establishing the exclusive causation standard.
In a footnote, the Templemire majority stated that strict adherence to stare
decisis would result in a society where discrimination would subject children
to being segregated into schools that were purportedly separate but equal,
where women could not serve on juries, and where interracial marriage would
be subject to criminal prosecution.180 Indeed, it can be said that these notions
are manifestly wrong. What is unclear is whether a high causation standard for
employees asserting workers’ compensation retaliation cases could be said to
be equivocally wrong to the aforementioned evils. The majority appears to use
injustices that previously plagued society to stir emotions and gain support for
their holding without discussing in any way how the exclusive causation
standard for workers’ compensation is similar to those events. Rather, through
little discussion, the court simply stated that stare decisis was best not applied
to the exclusive causation standard.181
Alternatively, the dissent noted that other than the passage of time and the
changing membership of the court there were no reasons, no recent changes of
society, and no inherent flaws in the exclusive causation standard that would
require an abandonment of stare decisis.182 The dissent admonished the
majority opinion for giving “short shrift” to the doctrine of stare decisis,
claiming the majority failed to recognize that adherence to precedent is most
important when the precedent in question concerns settled opinions of statutory
interpretation.183
Specifically, the dissent stressed the Missouri Supreme Court’s own
decision in Crabtree, which explicitly said that [the Missouri Supreme Court]
should not lightly disturb its own precedent and that mere disagreement by the
current court would not be a satisfactory basis for violating the doctrine of
stare decisis in the absence of recurring injustice or absurd results.184 The
question then remains as to whether recurring injustice or absurd results were
met by the exclusive causation standard. The court in Crabtree and the dissent
in Templemire, among others, did not believe the exclusive causation standard
reached the extreme classification of “absurd results.”185
compensation retaliation cases. However, it would be an argument that could possibility apply to
workers’ compensation retaliation cases as well.
180. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 380.
181. Id. at 379.
182. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 386–87.
183. Id. at 386.
184. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 386 (citing Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 71–72).
185. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 386–87 (citing Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 71–72). It should be
noted, the Court in Crabtree stated that the “absurd result” would be for the court to not uphold
the exclusive causation standard. The court wrote: “If there is an injustice or an absurdity, it
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Particularly, there are two United States Supreme Court Justices that would
arguably agree with the Crabtree court and Templemire dissent. In Alleyne v.
United States, United States Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor wrote:
“Establishing that a decision was wrong does not, without more, justify
overruling it.”186 Justice Sotomayor reasoned that courts should adhere to prior
decisions, even if their soundness is questionable, because doing so promotes
the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles
and fosters reliance on judicial decisions.187 Therefore, the question in
Templemire, as it was in Alleyene, should be whether any special justification
existed to justify departure from the important doctrine of stare decisis. The
Templemire majority classified the exclusive causation standard described in
Crabtree and Hansome as “an aberration. . .plucked out of thin air,” but still
did not state any special justification that would require departing from stare
decisis.188 Therefore, it seems likely that Justice Sotomayor would agree with
the dissent that the doctrine of stare decisis should be upheld in Templemire.
Secondly, in 1932, United States Supreme Court Justice Brandeis stated:
“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.
This is commonly true even when the error is a matter of serious concern,
provided correction can be had by legislation.”189 In his statement, Justice
Brandeis indicated that stare decisis should be strictly upheld for decisions that
concern statutory interpretation, as the legislature has the ability to correct an
improper interpretation.190 Whereas cases involving issues such as the United
States Constitution, which cannot easily be corrected through legislative

would be for this Court to abandon the requirement that the discharge be exclusively caused by
the exercise of rights pursuant to the workers’ compensation law. Under that rule, an employee
who admittedly was fired for tardiness, absenteeism, or incompetence at work would still be able
to maintain a cause of action for discharge if, in addition to the other causes, a cause for discharge
was the exercise of rights under the workers’ compensation laws”.
186. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 387 (citing Alleyene v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2164
(2013)).
187. Alleyene v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2164 (2013) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).
188. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379.
189. Id. at 387 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932)).
190. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 405–06 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis’ opinion has not
gone unrecognized. In 1990, the Supreme Court expressly adopted Brandeis’ statements in
Burnet, and refused to depart from precedent regarding to the interpretation of a statute in
California v. F.E.R.C., 495 U.S. 490, 500 (1990). The Court reaffirmed this interpretation again
in 2008, in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 138, 139 (2008).
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action, courts may be more lenient with the doctrine, as there is no other
available avenue to correct a previously wrong decision.191
Therefore, even if a special justification Justice Sotomayor discusses in
Alleyene could be asserted by the Templemire majority in overruling the
exclusive causation standard,192 there is still a strong argument for upholding
the exclusive causation standard for workers’ compensation retaliation
cases.193 The exclusive causation standard articulated in Hansome and
Crabtree are statutory interpretations of the language of Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 287.780.194 Therefore, according to Justice Brandeis and the
dissent of Templemire, stare decisis should be given great effect for workers’
compensation retaliation cases.195 Indeed, as Justice Brandeis predicted, the
Missouri General Assembly did in fact have the opportunity to change the law
and the exclusive causation standard in 2005, but neglected to do so.196 Thus,
the statutory interpretation of the exclusive causation standard for workers’
compensation retaliation laws should be upheld.197
Of all the arguments present in the Templemire decision, the strongest
argument for upholding the exclusive causation standard is one that is merely
brushed over by the majority.198 The majority ironically called Hansome “an
aberration, in which the ‘exclusive’ language appears to be plucked out of thin
air with no support in the case law or statutory interpretation.”199 However, in
their disregard for stare decisis, it is the majority who seems to be plucking the
contributing factor standard out of thin air, as there are no previous workers’
compensation retaliation cases nor explicit wording in a Missouri statute to
support its implementation.200 Therefore, it can only be said that the majority
disregarded the doctrine of stare decisis and disposed of three decades worth

191. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406–07 (Brandeis J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis states: “In cases
involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically
impossible, this court has often overruled its earlier decisions. . .”
192. As detailed infra Section VI, it appears that no special justification exists. The majority
opinion in Templemire finds it necessary to overrule the exclusive causation standard, and yet
does not give any special justification other than its finding that the exclusive causation standard
was arbitrarily selected by the court in Hansome and Crabtree.
193. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406.
194. See Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984) and Crabtree
v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. 1998).
195. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 387. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
196. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 389–390; see also STOKES, supra note 83 (outlining many of
the changes made to workers’ compensation laws in the 2005 amendments).
197. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 387 (Fischer, J., dissenting).
198. A small section of the Templemire majority opinion is dedicated to the discussion of
stare decisis. The court’s main reasoning for doing away with stare decisis is that the Hansome
decision’s reliance on Mitchell and Davis was unfounded. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379–80.
199. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379.
200. See discussion infra Section IV of the history of workers’ compensation retaliation cases.
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of precedent for what appears to be nothing more than mere disapproval of the
previous courts’ interpretation.201
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Templemire decision created historic changes in Missouri workers’
compensation law. The decision significantly improved discharged and injured
employees’ chances of winning a case against their employer by reducing the
standard from exclusive causation to contributing factor. Some welcomed the
new contributing factor standard as giving employees a “realistic chance” of
recovering damages.”202 Others note the discussion in Crabtree, that a lower
standard for workers’ compensation retaliation would result in an employee,
who admittedly was fired for tardiness, absenteeism, or incompetence at work,
being able to maintain a cause of action for discharge if, in addition to the
above causes, [they exercised a right] under the workers’ compensation
laws.203
Aside from the more practical aspects of the change from exclusive
causation standard to contributing factor standard, Templemire should cause
great concern over the status of stare decisis in Missouri. With minimal
discussion and unclear reasoning, the Missouri Supreme Court threw away
over three decades worth of precedent in three paragraphs of a decision in
Templemire.204 The Templemire majority, who criticized prior courts as having
plucked the exclusive causation test out of thin air, did exactly what they
condoned when they disregarded precedent and created the contributing factor
standard– a standard that is in no way stated in Section 287.780 of the Missouri
Revised Statutes.205
Stare decisis is a foundation of the law of the United States, which as
Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor stated in Alleyene, promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles and
fosters reliance on judicial decisions.206 However, if the Missouri Supreme
Court can be so hypocritical and inconsistent with decades worth of precedent,
then what are the people of Missouri supposed to rely on? If long-standing
201. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379.
202. MATTHEW SIMS, Missouri Workers’ Compensation: Wrongful Termination- Fired After
Making a Claim for Benefits, THE SIMS LAW FIRM, availble at http://www.simslaw.com/missour
i-workers-compensation-wrongful-termination-fired-making-claim-benefits/ (last visited Jan. 19,
2015).
203. Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 72. Again, note this situation occurred in Mitchell, as Mitchell
was fired for absenteeism that resulted from missed bus connections, bad weather, family illness,
oversleeping, and gynecological appoints. However, because she also missed work for reasons
related to her back injury, her employer would now be forbidden from firing her.
204. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379–80.
205. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379–80; MO. REV. STAT. §287.780 (2014).
206. Alleyene v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2164 (2013).
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laws can be disregarded with such little deliberations, Missouri citizens should
be very weary to depend on the rulings of courts in their state.
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